



ALMA operations start lessons learned

ngVLA workshop

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
Prepared by: S. Guniat

- Project – risks and legacy
- Reality specific difficulties
- Consequences
- Ongoing actions
- Lessons learned





Project – risks and legacy





Project – risks and legacy

- During development, the objective has been to:
 - Maximize MTBFs of critical/prototypes subsystems to increase reliability and reduce maintenance effort
 - Minimize maintenance and operations staff expertise needs (on delicate subsystems mainly)

➤ *All operations plans have been based on the above hypothesis*
- During construction, the objective has been to:
 - Keep the budget and schedule under control
 - Reach acceptance of subsystems to be delivered

➤ *Who is the customer? Future operating crews or/and project stakeholders?*

➤ *Where is the operational model consolidated at observatory system level?*

At inauguration everything has to run – at least once.....



Reality specific difficulties

- Partnership complexity (3 executives +JAO, different cultures, distance) and challenging project
 - Tough project negotiations leave burnt people who will have to live together during operations for a long time
- Project de-scoping effects on operations (as foreseen and as performed)
 - Maintenance model differ from foreseen one and de-scoping has unexpected consequences:
 - High reliability maintained in scheduled way at low altitude versus permanent attention at high altitude
 - Processes and tools criticality maybe different
- The machine has to work every day
 - But it remains a prototype.....
- The hardware is not behaving as expected
 - Several technologies are not commonly used in this environment at least for OTS hardware



Reality specific difficulties

- The trivial subsystems are essential
 - The best possible antenna needs power, communication....
 - State of the art technology can also become a prototype in specific conditions
- Staff turn over partly invalidates the training effort
 - Project people are often not funded for routine operations (and may not be suited)
 - People have grown along the long project and like it
- Providers/stakeholders also re-assign knowledgeable people (in depth knowledge becomes difficult to access)
 - Once the deliverable is accepted, high profile people are needed on the next burning issue
- If you do not suffer, you often do not care much
 - Human nature



Consequences

- The ramp up is slower than expected
 - Maintenance procedures and tools have to be re-assessed
 - Maintenance approach requires remote troubleshooting and (de-scoped) means re-implementation
 - Project backlog has to be finished even if focus is optimized to real conditions
 - All originally serialized transition steps have to be performed in parallel with relevant risks (training, troubleshooting, upgrading, and maintaining, in all areas, not only engineering)
- The critical subsystems perform well but the trivial ones suffer “fast track finishing”, de-scoping and lack of global operational vision
 - Basically an immediate upgrade project phase
- Staff turn over, including management, is a sort of “start from scratch”!
 - But also a new opportunity as some good people were burnt along the way



Ongoing actions

- Recovering a trustful relationship with all stakeholders around a unique objective – science production
- Aligning community expectation to realistic goals
 - Plan functionalities and performance targets ramp up
- Trying to understand the best path towards operations efficiency
 - No perfect path but learning curve
 - Iterative resources needs/spending exercises
- Separating staff assignment when priorities are incompatible
 - Troubleshooting
 - Preventative maintenance
 - Remaining project work
- Work share and skillset/ownership re-evaluation
 - Optimize cost and reaction time versus distance, cost, people availability and skillset



Lessons learned

- Can all this be avoided in our kind of activity?
 - Not if project phases and organization does not evolve significantly
 - The projects remain very ambitious and risky versus available budget
 - As the size increases, the number of partners grows and culture is still scientific/evolutionary
 - There are solutions but based on other models (space...)
 - MTBF approach... is sound
- Similar project lessons learned is already challenging/difficult
 - The project size has political implications
 - These project frequency is low in astronomy and industrial environment evolve
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- Can this tough transition phase, from project to operations, be mitigated
 - YES!



Lessons learned

- No magic solution during project phase
 - and build up a systems team (observatory level) with adequate system level technical budgets
 - Try to involve as early as possible experienced operation people in reviews
 - Avoid re-inventing warm water and subcontract to real experts
 - During construction de-scoping, involve future operating teams (balanced evaluation)
 - Allow to think that your hardware is not perfect and consider alternatives/contingency
 - Do not over play warranty – could become a trap
- Acceptance and operations start
 - The project as such shall have an end although there is remaining work
 - Approach completion task lists realistically by separate teams evaluation
 - Do not de-mobilize experts to fast (condition based maint/training)
 - Consider cultural aspect (international to local, project to operators)
 - Avoid overselling success and start up speed
 - be humble and put real effort in managing expectations



Lessons learned

- Keep money..... and expect to spend it
 - Budgets and resources forecasts still will require iterations
- Face first problems.... with philosophy
 - The ramp up requires transparency for objective risks assessment and optimized decisions
 - The efforts coordination require trust, furthermore in complex, new organizations
 - The operational world is pretty different from the project one and not obvious to approach for people who do lived this experience